Europe’s Capital Markets puzzle. ECMI Policy Brief No 28 17 Nov 2020. by Lannoo, Karel & Thomadakis, Apostolos
European Capital Markets Institute, Place du Congrès 1, 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
www.ecmi.eu, ecmi@ceps.eu 
© Copyright 2020, Karel Lannoo & Apostolos Thomadakis. All rights reserved. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
Europe’s capital markets puzzle 
Karel Lannoo and Apostolos Thomadakis1 
 
Karel Lannoo is General Manager of ECMI and CEO of CEPS 
Apostolos Thomadakis Ph.D. is Researcher at ECMI and CEPS  
 
Creating an attractive framework for more market financing in Europe is proving to be an increasingly 
complex puzzle. The EU and other European states are battling on several fronts, but without the unity 
and vision that is needed to move forward. Brexit is one of the difficult pieces of the puzzle, but also 
problematic is the dominance of universal banks, even more in mainland Europe, and limited 
acquaintance with more market finance. Market financing is however paramount for Europe’s 
competitiveness.  
The EU Commission’s latest action plan – the New CMU Action Plan – lacks workable solutions and gets 
lost in small items that will not allow for significant change or bring Europe’s markets up to speed. Some 
weeks earlier, but why not as part of the plan is unclear, the EU Commission proposed amendments to 
three key measures from the earlier wave in the name of Covid-19: the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID II), prospectus and securitisation regulations. A positive development on the horizon is 
the emergence of a euro safe asset, a crucial building block for European capital markets, but the issues 
it raises are not reflected in the action plan either. Six years after the launch, we are no closer to the 
benchmark set by the United States.  
The real actionable items of the new plan are limited; several elements are intentions, proposals for 
studies or elements to strengthen existing frameworks. Of course, there is no need for an extensive new 
legislative agenda because the EU has been engaged in these issues since the announcement of the 
Financial Services Action Programme (FSAP) in 1998; much has been achieved and changed in the 
meantime. What is missing is a vision of what the EU wants to achieve, by when and how, on which 
there seems to be no agreement. The incremental approach followed over in recent years is now 
harming the EU’s long-term interests. 
To put this into context, we will discuss the EU from the perspective of global markets since the CMU 
was launched in 2014, and what this implies for the EU’s attractiveness. In a second step, we will assess 
the key elements of the plan, and the other amendments that have been proposed recently. In a third 
step, we will look at elements that are missing in the plan, before concluding. 
                                                          
1 Input from ECMI members and speakers at the 10th ECMI Annual Conference on 6 November 2020 are gratefully 
acknowledged. The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone. 
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The EU’s capital markets in perspective 
“Competitiveness is essential to make the European Union a more attractive location. A location for 
people, for investors”, said Commission President Juncker in his 2014 State of the Union address, when 
announcing the CMU Plan. Six years later, it seems that we have not become more attractive – on the 
contrary. On the equity market side, the US capital market, as measured by the equity market index 
(MSCI), has advanced enormously over the last five years, while Europe has remained flat (see Figure 
1). We have clearly not achieved what CMU was aiming to do in 2014 – become more market driven. 
The attractiveness of the equity markets as a source of financing remains low, at approximately half the 
size of that in the US (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1: Performance of equity indices in Europe and the US 
 
Notes: The graph plots the price of the MSCI Europe index and the MSCI US index for the period August 2014 to 
October 2020. The MSCI Europe captures large and mid-cap representation across 15 developed markets 
countries in Europe (i.e. AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IR, IT, NL, NO, PT, ES, SE, CH and UK. August 2014 prices were set 
to 100.  
Source: authors’ own calculations based on MSCI data. 
 
Figure 2: Capital market structure (% GDP, 2015 and 2019) 
 
Note: Debt securities markets include: government, financial institutions and corporate debt securities.   
Source: authors’ own calculations based on FESE, WFE, IMF, as well as data collected from national exchanges. 
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On the debt securities markets, in Europe the sector is about half the size of that in the US: in 2019 the 
amount outstanding of European debt securities was €19.5 trillion (€18.2 trillion in 2015) compared to 
€36.6 trillion (€32.2 trillion in 2015) in the US. Debt securities issued by governments and financial 
institutions have taken up the largest part of the financial system, with corporate debt securities 
representing a very small fraction. This is due to the heavy reliance of European non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) on bank lending and unlisted equity capital. As a result, European securities markets 
for corporations are almost one third of their US counterparts (see Figure 3).    
Figure 3. Debt securities, amounts outstanding (% GDP, average 2015-2019) 
 
Source: authors’ own calculations based on BIS and IMF data. 
Other forms of market finance, such as crowdfunding, venture capital and private equity, are of very 
limited use in Europe – especially for young, small and innovative companies. The issuance of equity 
and bonds is not the preferred option and rarely considered by SMEs (Thomadakis, 2017), while 
crowdfunding, which is very limited in size, did not live up to expectations post-crisis. Business angel 
financing, which is of comparable size to venture capital funding, is usually under the radar of SMEs. 
Finally, private equity is the most preferred risk capital source of funding for more mature companies 
at the growth stage. 
Despite encouraging recent progress in the availability of risk capital for European SMEs, the gap with 
the US is increasing. The average annual amount of risk capital in the US over the period 2015-18 was 
around €149 billion, almost nine times the amount invested in the EU-27 (€17 billion) (see Figure 4).2 
Compared to the size of the respective economies, the US pre-IPO risk capital represents 1.2% of GDP, 
while in Europe it represents 0.14% of GDP. The gap is even bigger when looking at the stage of VC 
investments, with European VCs investing more on seed and start-ups compared to their US 
counterparts, and less into companies that are in their later stage (AMAFI, 2020). 
                                                          
2 In the US, the amount invested increased by 32% between 2015 and 2018 (from €142 billion in 2015 to €188 
billion in 2018), while in Europe by 27% (from €15 billion in 2015 to €19 billion in 2019).    
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Figure 4. Pre-IPO risk capital investment by asset class (€ billion, average 2015-2018) 
 
Source: EBAN, Invest Europe, NVCA, Center for Venture Research. 
Overall, it may be useful to agree on some benchmarks that can be used to measure progress towards 
more market financing in Europe, and towards more market integration. On the latter, the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) indicator is well known, but not yet sufficiently referenced. According to the latest 
data, we are only half way from full integration when taking the price indicator into account, and just 
one-third away when considering the volume indicator (see Figure 5). In the retail domain, the figure is 
much lower, and it is commonly assumed that 1% of financial services provision is cross-border. This 
matters because, as for other products, price and quality competition does not work sufficiently. 
Indicators for more market finance were proposed by AFME, the association of large banks and 
operators in European capital markets. Its latest edition found little progress, except for bond financing 
in the first half of 2020, in response to the Covid crisis (AFME, 2020). 
Figure 5. Financial integration indicators (1999Q1-2020Q2) 
 
Notes: The price-based composite indicator aggregates ten indicators for money, bond, equity and retail banking 
markets, while the quantity-based composite indicator aggregates five indicators for the same market segments 
except retail banking. The indicators are bounded between zero (full fragmentation) and one (full integration). 
Source: ECB. 
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Achievements of CMU 1.0 
The Investment Firm Regime and the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) Review can be considered 
as the main achievements of CMU 1.0. Opinions on the impact of the securitisation, the prospectus and 
the Personal Pension Product (PEPP) regulations are divided – the first two will be revised, and the 
implementation of the third has only started. Overall, the views were that more could have been 
achieved, and that often good proposals were watered down in the decision-making process, as was 
the case for the PEPP, for example. But CMU was definitely put on the agenda as a key issue for the EU. 
• The investment firm regime (IFR) introduces a harmonised regime for non-bank investment 
firms in the EU, something that would not have been possible with the UK still as a member. 
Most of these investment firms are established in the United Kingdom (55%), followed by 
Germany, France and the Netherlands. Some of the European operations of large US banks, 
or parts of them, fell under the more lenient regime, which has now been added to bank 
regime (the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV), and brought under the supervision of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the EU. The UK has already indicated that will 
go back to the former regime in 2021. 
• The ESA review reinforces the role of the ESAs, above all for the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) with new unique supervisory tasks (e.g. for central counterparty 
clearing houses (CCPs), data providers and benchmarks) but also for more direct 
interventions in the markets. This can be expected to expand further as a result of the 
amendments to Art. 9 regarding consumer and investor protection. The governance 
structure remains very much oriented towards the member states, which each of them 
having one vote in the supervisory board, but with a more central role for the chair. 
• The PEPP is a missed opportunity for an EU-wide long-term savings product, not because of 
the Commission’s proposal, but of the outcome in the EU Council and European Parliament. 
Key elements of the proposal were watered down or replaced in response to heavy pressure 
from member states and interest groups (Lannoo, 2019). Rather than a broad long-term 
savings product, it became a 3rd pillar insurance product only, as there is always a 
guarantee element involved. This narrowed the scope considerably. In addition, the role 
foreseen for the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) as a 
unifier of markets was greatly reduced.  
The attractiveness of the prospectus and securitisation regulation were seen to be undermined by a 
lack of change, rules that were too demanding and hence without substantial impact. It will be further 
revised. 
The CMU 2 Action Plan 
In the introduction, the Commission says that “a lot still remains to be done and it is now time to step 
up the level of ambition”, and “strong political support is now needed more than ever”, but not much in 
the plan responds to this aspiration. The second CMU Action plan is composed of 16 actions, but none 
of these is expected to be controversial or require big changes (EC, 2020a). The overall themes are 
mainstream: adaptation to the green recovery and digitalisation, more disclosure, and better access to 
finance for SMEs. There is one exception: a proposed EU-wide system for withholding tax relief at 
source. This, if achieved, would be very welcome, as the diversity of tax systems is a major barrier to 
cross-border holdings, certainly at the retail level. But it concerns tax harmonisation, which requires 
unanimity in the EU Council. 
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What should then be the core elements? There was certainly no shortage of input from the private 
sector and member states with, for example, the report of the Next CMU High-Level Group (NextCMU, 
2019), and the EU Commission’s own High Level Forum (HLF, 2020). ECMI’s Rebranding CMU task force 
report (Lannoo and Thomadakis, 2019) singled out a few areas that could bring major change: 
• Government bond markets: they are an important building block for capital markets, and a 
benchmark for other segments. Primary markets for government bonds should be 
integrated on the basis of EU rules. A euro area safe asset would be a major step towards 
more integration in Europe’s capital markets and further enhance private risk-sharing.  
• Start-ups, high growth companies and SMEs: much remains to be done to bring SMEs to the 
markets. The SME Growth Market label requires exclusive focus on SMEs with less complex 
requirements/costs than the regimes for ordinary regulated markets. Consistent definitions 
of SMEs across different pieces of legislation are necessary, which however is far from easy, 
for tax and other reasons. 
• Investment fund markets and long-term savings: further initiatives are required to reduce 
the costs of fund investments by households on the basis of a few clear benchmarks, and 
to channel the savings of European households into long-term assets. The importance of 
attractive long-term savings vehicles was also emphasised by NextCMU (2019). 
On the first item, a major step was taken on the euro safe asset, with the EU Commission market 
borrowing, on the basis of its triple AAA rating, for the EU recovery fund, NextGeneration EU 
(NextGenEU). Together with the borrowing by the other EU entities, such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), the total borrowing of the EU under the top rating could reach €1.4 trillion,3 a major step towards 
a euro safe asset. This is a much more straightforward way than through the ‘ESBies’, the securitised 
portfolio of eurozone sovereign bonds, on which a Commission proposal was made in 2018, or E-bonds, 
potentially issued by the ESM. As an indication, the first tranches under the SURE programme that were 
placed on 23 October 2020 were about 10 times oversubscribed. The bonds are issued under 
Luxembourg law and listed on the local stock exchange. The advantage of these bonds is that they may 
form the reference yields over different maturities for other debt securities. 
On access to market finance for the SME, several lines are pursued. The most important are the SME 
IPO fund announced by the EU Commission President in her inaugural speech for the EP in July 2019, 
and the EIB’s €25 billion Pan-European Guarantee Fund in response to Covid-19 crisis.4 The EU 
Commission will also attempt to simplify the listing rules for SMEs, to allow for immediate listing on an 
exchange platform without a formal initial public offering procedure, as Spotify did when it listed on the 
Nasdaq in April 2018. But reducing the listing burden for SMEs is difficult without undoing the necessary 
disclosure and investor protection. Related is the lack of proper research on listed SME stocks, on which 
controversy has been raging for some time. With the unbundling under MiFID II, sponsored research is 
no longer allowed, which for some is the reason for the insufficient coverage and take-off of SME stocks. 
The Commission therefore proposed to make an exemption for small caps in the MiFID ‘quick fix’ or 
limited amendments, proposed outside the action plan of 26 July (the reason for this is unclear), which 
                                                          
3 Importantly, about half of that amount (€850 billion) is a one-off operation linked to this extraordinary crisis with 
a 30-year maturity. This means that coverage of different maturities is not assured. In addition, issuance of ‘safe 
debt’ by the various European institutions is not really harmonised or traded in an integrated way (Constâncio et 
al., 2020). 
4 The latter can also be used for equity support for SMEs. This comes in addition to the already existing European 
Investment Fund (EIF), managed by the EIB. 
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may however do away with unbundling all together. ESMA found no evidence of the link between 
unbundling and SME research coverage; as ESMA Chair Maijoor said in a recent conference speech: “I 
fail to see how undoing the research unbundling provisions, which began in 2018, can improve research 
availability for SMEs.” (Maijoor, 2020).  
A major component of long-term savings is costs. Unbundling was introduced by MiFID II to also allow 
for a more transparent reporting of costs, and to tackle conflicts of interest. It has shown to contribute 
to lowering the costs of funds for retail investors, as data for the UK and the Netherlands – the countries 
that have had these rules in place for longer. An initiative to reduce the costs of funds, long highlighted 
by ESMA, is however missing from the CMU 2.0. As ESMA noted: “costs remain a critical component in 
final investor benefits, with retail investors paying higher costs than institutional investors” (ESMA, 
2020). Moreover, the study highlights that UCITS have a highly variable gross annual performance (…), 
while costs remained broadly stable over time and only marginally declined in the analysed period (on 
average 1.5% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2017).  
According to ESMA, a hypothetical 10-year retail investment of €10,000 in the period from 2009 to 2018 
provided a value after costs of around €16,045, with costs amounting to about €2,627. Add to this the 
entry and exit cost of funds and this explains the much lower share of funds in household savings in the 
EU than the US, and the lack of a critical ‘buy side‘ component for Europe’s capital markets. In addition, 
the high variety of funds available makes it “complicated for investors to consistently identify 
outperforming UCITS”, according to ESMA.  
Moving beyond CMU 2.0 
There is much more affecting the EU’s capital markets that is not (sufficiently) covered in the latest 
action plan. It may be there between the lines, or it may not be there on purpose. Just take some 
important developments, such as the ECB with the European Distribution of Debt Instruments (EDDI), 
Brexit and its implications, the role of ESMA, and digital finance. 
The ECB and EDDI 
With its central role, even more with its massive bond purchase programmes, the ECB has an interest 
in well-integrated bond markets. In addition, in the execution of its monetary policy operations, it is 
confronted on a daily basis with the structural imperfections of European capital markets. Collateral sits 
in CSDs in the different eurozone states, and cannot be moved across countries easily – an issue that is 
as old as monetary union. It creates additional costs for banks and institutional investors. 
Procedures for the issuance of government debt, and also other elements of the settlement systems for 
securities are not yet harmonised at EU level, which keeps EU markets fragmented. The second element 
is part of a consideration in the CMU 2.0 plan, but the first has never been formally addressed, which is 
surprising, given the NextGenEU issuance plans. This ECB jumped into the void in 2019 with the initiative 
in EDDI. For the ECB, the European securities settlement systems continue to be extremely fragmented, 
notwithstanding 20 years of discussions, causing higher costs and inefficiencies, and maintaining local 
monopolies and home bias.  
With EDDI, the ECB plans to introduce a pre-issuance harmonised toolkit, and a post-trade 
standardisation and harmonisation of the ‘Giovannini barriers’, as identified in a 2000 EU Commission 
report. It includes a European debt instrument technical standard, a standardised term sheet template, 
harmonised rounding and day-count conventions, and revisiting withholding tax procedures initiatives. 
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“Issuers face today procedures that have not changed for decades and still heavily rely on manual 
interaction and low level of automation. A standardised and innovative European solution is long 
overdue’, the ECB says in the inaugural presentation of the initiative (ECB, 2019). This simply indicates 
the level of change that is needed to bring Europe’s capital markets up to speed. 
Green and social bonds 
The green transition gets a lot of attention in the CMU action plan, but the synergies with the 
Sustainable Finance agenda and recovery package need to be further enhanced. The EU is planning to 
publish a (voluntary) standard for green bonds in the first half of next year, but this is likely to meet 
resistance as the criteria are set too high. A target of 30% of the NextGenerationEU fund was set to be 
raised through green bonds. EU governments have already issued ‘green’ bonds, but they may be wary 
of having too much prescription that restricts their freedom. The first-ever German Green bond, issued 
in September, was allocated to already existing infrastructure projects. However, “this retrospective 
approach will not lead to any structural shifts in the budget to favour commitments that bring the 
country closer to fulfilling its emission-reduction commitments, for example. Under this framework, 
green bonds are little more than window-dressing” (Kraemer, 2020). This already indicates how 
problematic it will be to set a standard at EU level (or whether governments will be exempted, as is the 
case under the prospectus regulation). From a capital markets perspective, the segment of green bonds 
issued by corporates is increasing but has yet to reach its full potential, in particular due to the demand 
from asset managers and institutional investors. 
Social bonds have been less on the radar, but this could change rapidly, as the Covid-19 crisis has already 
shown. In particular, market finance is an underdeveloped resource for dealing with research on 
vaccines. It is probably somewhat known on the equity side, but much less so on the bond markets side. 
Strong global collective action can achieve broad social goals, and social bonds are poised to play a 
crucial role in these endeavours. It may appeal to international institutions, national governments but 
also foundations and philanthropists. Some standards already exist in this domain, such as the ICMA 
social bonds, as used by the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFM) for the development 
of vaccines (Karsenti, 2020). Much like greenwashing, the risk of social washing must be avoided, for 
example through the development of an EU Social Taxonomy. The €17bn inaugural bond under the 
SURE instrument was issued by the EU Commission as a social bond. 
The impact of Brexit 
As the trade deal discussions are not advancing smoothly, a solution will have to be found beyond ad 
hoc measures to ensure continued interaction between the EU and the UK, and not to descend into a 
lose-lose situation for both sides. London remains the biggest financial centre in the world; its role will 
therefore continue to be important for the EU. On access to clearing and share trading, temporary 
solutions were found, but no permanent structure exists for both to meet. In addition, the departure of 
the UK was already noted in the MiFID ‘quick fix’ amendments, which would not have been proposed 
otherwise. 
Debates around the MiFID ‘quick fix’, as well as other regulatory matters, highlight another risk of Brexit 
– the far greater flexibility and rapidity the UK will have to change rules. Whereas EU rules have become 
continuously more detailed in level one (because of the level playing field) and level two (as changes 
need to go through amendments following different but lengthy procedures), UK regulators will allow 
greater discretion to supervisors implementing them, as happens in other sovereign jurisdictions. This 
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difference risks putting the EU’s financial markets at a competitive disadvantage, and requires urgent 
attention by policymakers. 
The role of ESMA 
ESMA’s role was enhanced considerably in the 2019 ESA review, with additional unique supervisory 
responsibilities for data providers, benchmarks and third country CCPs. To cope with this, ESMA’s staff 
will reach 380 persons by the year end, to become the largest of all the European supervisory agencies. 
ESMA can thus be expected to play an even more important role in Europe’s securities markets. It is 
however not comforting to see that ESMA’s positions often seem to be put aside by the European 
Commission, as indicated above. 
The expansion of ESMA’s tasks add to the existing specific tasks of the supervision of credit-rating 
agencies and trade repositories, and the generic product supervision and peer review of supervisors. 
The first tasks appear to have gone well, as 10 years after the start, business as usual prevails. There are 
no complaints from either side about the performance of these tasks; ESMA is thus in a good position 
to start new ones. ESMA’s expansion can also be expected to lead to more generic supervisory tasks. 
The peer review of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the supervision of the audit 
sector in Germany after the Wirecard crash gives an indication of what is to come. The audit sector lacks 
EU-wide supervision, something ESMA’s chair has often pointed out. 
ESMA’s more central role in securities markets should thus also lead to a greater appreciation of its role 
in the EU Commission. But this is not really the case. To the outside world, the EU Commission should 
do the opposite if it wants to strengthen the case for a capital markets union. Only a unified approach 
can bring more capital market financing to Europe, not assorted conflicts. 
Where is digital? 
CMU 2.0 has little on digital aspects, while markets are steaming ahead. The EU issued its cryptocurrency 
proposal in September 2020, but this covers different grounds, from crypto-assets, stablecoins to e-
money tokens (EC, 2020). Overall, it aims to create a harmonised regulatory framework for crypto assets 
in the EU and overcome the diversity of approaches that exist in EU member states. It also includes a 
mandate for ESMA to establish a register of all crypto-asset service providers. 
Crypto-assets and the distributed ledger technology (DLT) that underpins them have attracted 
significant attention globally. DLT has the potential to deliver substantial benefits, both in financial 
services and other sectors. Crypto-assets are one application of DLT, and whilst it has grown in some EU 
markets, it remains small compared to other jurisdictions. But crypto-assets require a unified response 
to counter the use for illicit activity and to restrict the sale to retail investors. 
To clarify that this concerns initial public offering of crypto-assets, it would have been better to package 
the Commission‘s proposal within the CMU plan, and to distinguish it clearly from the e-payment related 
parts of the proposal. This would also have facilitated the understanding and treatment of this proposal 
on the different legislative levels in the EU, and demonstrated that the EU is taking action in this field. 
Conclusion 
Efficient capital markets are characterised by: the depth of the intermediation system (including the 
availability and liquidity of credit, equity, debt, insurances, and other financial products); prices that 
reflect all available public information; the capacity to pool and manage risks through hedging; as well 
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as the tendency to effectively allocate savings to their most productive investment uses. This level of 
efficiency can only be achieved when capital markets are well-developed and fully integrated. 
The first phase of the CMU project mainly focused on the development of capital markets (even only at 
national level), and significantly less on the clear and ambitious goal of the CMU, which is the removal 
of cross-border obstacles and the creation of a single unified capital market. Six years after the start of 
CMU, Europe has moved backwards rather than forwards towards a more balanced financial system. In 
fact, European capital markets remain highly fragmented, economic agents do not face identical rules 
and do not have equal access to financial instruments or services. Market participants are interacting in 
silos that are less liquid, less diverse and less competitive.  
Fragmentation has led to smaller and disconnected liquidity pools with less efficient and more volatile 
pricing. Market financing is not advancing, Europe’s competitiveness is under scrutiny, while euro’s 
international role is close to historical lows. A major initiative from European policymakers is sorely 
needed. 
The European Commission wants an industrial strategy for strategic autonomy, but the basis – the 
means of financing such investments – is not on the cards. To make a difference, Europe will need more 
pronounced initiatives, affecting the supply of market finance, the rules for the large and small issuers 
in capital markets, and a further strengthening of the role of the central market authority, ESMA. It will 
need to ensure that the massive amounts of household savings find their way to the markets, and do 
not languish in bank accounts.  
Given the closer interaction with the private sector, and the challenging departure of the world’s largest 
financial centre from the EU, it would be useful to create a permanent monitoring committee for the 
CMU-related initiatives, to agree on some indicators and set targets. 
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